When you become dissatisfied with the ice cream you eat, the political party you belong to, or the country you live in, what can you do? You could stop eating Breyer's and start eating Häagen-Dazs (exit), you could write letters to the Democratic National Committee (voice), or you could give up your citizenship and move to Canada (exit again). That's the subject of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty.

One of Hirschman's achievements is to bridge the thinking from two fields that don't always talk to each other. Exit is usually the province of economists, related to supply and demand, because the usual response of a dissatisfied consumer is to leave rather than to protest. (High-priced items like cars, however, are more likely to prompt complaints.) Voice, including petitions, letters to the editor, demonstrations, and other expressions of discontent, is the province of political scientists.

The concept of exit adds some nuances to the traditional supply-and-demand model. Both an increase in price and a decrease in quality may cause customers to leave, Hirschman points out, but they may not be the same customers. A consumer of a “connoisseur” product such as caviar, for instance, may be willing to put up with higher prices but not lower quality.

If exit is available, voice may be undermined. In the example that prompted this book, Hirschman noticed that train service in Nigeria, although it faced competition from trucking, continued to be terrible year after year. Because shipping crops by truck was a cheap and attractive alternative, the trains (which received government funding) had little motivation to change — especially since there were no other competing train systems. Neither exit nor voice was enough to improve train service.

If there were no trucks in Nigeria, however, and trains monopolized transportation, Hirschman argues that voice would become more prevalent and more effective. If customers are “trapped,” they are more likely to protest, and sometimes that protest will change the organization. The same phenomenon applies in a two-party political system. Radical elements with nowhere else to go will work hard to change their party. This, he argues, is how hard-right elements in the Republican Party were able to nominate Barry Goldwater for President. Goldwater's lack of broad-based support became obvious on election day.

When an organization is in decline, not everybody protests or leaves. Many are simply apathetic, but some stay with the organization out of loyalty. What does this loyalty consist of? In organizations, some stay because it was expensive or difficult to join. Expensive country clubs and fraternities with hazing rituals therefore inspire the most loyalty. In a government, some people may stay out of concern for the public good — believing that they can help keep things from getting worse. (Hirschman points out, though, that an occasional noisy exit can be very effective, and that there is something wrong with administrations like those of LBJ — and George W. Bush — where loyalty is paramount and nobody resigns in protest.)

Although it's more than thirty years old, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty continues to yield interesting ideas for our lives as consumers, activists, and citizens.